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In this paper we present a simple model for assessing the willing-
ness to pay for reductions in the risk associated with catastrophic
climate change. The model is extremely tractable and applies to a
multiregion world but with global externalities and has five key
features: (i) Neither the occurrence nor the costs of a catastrophic
event in any one year are precisely predictable; (ii) the probabil-
ity of a catastrophe occurring in any one year increases as the
levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere increase; (iii) green-
house gases are a worldwide public bad with emissions from any
one country or region increasing the risks for all; (iv) there is two-
sided irreversibility; if nothing is done and the problem proves
serious, the climate, economic activity, and human life will suffer
permanent damage, but if we spend large sums on countermea-
sures and the problem turns out to be minor or even nonexistent,
we will have wasted resources unnecessarily; and (v) technolog-
ical progress may yield partial or even complete solutions. The
framework that we propose can give a sense of the quantitative
significance of mitigation strategies. We illustrate these for a core
set of parameter values.
catastrophic climate risk | global stock externality |
climate change mitigation
I t is a truth almost universally acknowledged that greenhousegas (GHG) accumulation is contributing to climate change
and increasing the risk of catastrophes such as cyclones, floods,
droughts, and wildfires. Several aspects of this are important:
(i) Although the broad mechanism by which climate change
occurs is well established, neither the occurrence nor the costs
of a catastrophic event in any one year are precisely predictable.
There is much uncertainty, and the policy issue is mitigation
of large risks. (ii) The probability of a catastrophe occurring in
any one year increases as the levels of GHG in the atmosphere
increase. (iii) GHGs are a worldwide public bad; emissions from
any one country or region increase the risks for all. (iv) There
is two-sided irreversibility of policies. If we do nothing and
the problem proves serious, the climate, economic activity, and
human life will suffer permanent damage, but if we spend large
sums on countermeasures and the problem turns out to be minor
or even nonexistent, we will have wasted resources unnecessar-
ily. (v) Technological progress may yield partial or even complete
solutions such as rapid and efficient carbon removal, injecting
sulfur particles into the upper atmosphere, or some other form
of geoengineering.
This paper presents a simple, user-friendly model that puts
these elements together and which can be understood intuitively.
Previous analytically tractable models have tended to have only
one or two of the features highlighted above. More complex
approaches, such as those embedded in integrated assessment
models, do include all of these features but this comes at the
cost of complexity, making it difficult to develop an intuitive
understanding of findings.
Our approach is not meant to substitute for detailed modeling
but rather is a way of building an intuitive understanding of some
issues and creating a ready reckoner to inform debate. It permits
calculation of the expected economic costs of such environmen-
tal catastrophes and yields upper bounds on the sums we should
be willing to spend on countermeasures.
The tractability of the model makes it straightforward to
apply to a multiregion world but with global externalities and
hence to look at how willingness to pay in one region varies
with mitigation measures taken in other regions. This is impor-
tant since most examples of policies to combat climate change
require international cooperation. For example, the United
States pulling out of the Paris climate accord could affect the
willingness of other countries to make sacrifices to combat cli-
mate change. We can also give a back-of-the-envelope sense of
the quantitative significance of such effects.
We propose a simple way of looking at things by calculating the
cost it would be worth paying to achieve specified target levels
of mitigation. Even being quite conservative, we find numbers
upward of 1% of gross domestic product (GDP). This can justify
substantial expenditures in pursuit of those targets; for example,
for the United States this amounts to spending about $190 billion
every year, far more than anyone has proposed for such policies.
Our numerical results, which can be performed using an Excel
file (Dataset S1), show that the willingness of one region to spend
resources to reduce GHG emissions is higher if other regions
are also contributing their efforts; in game-theoretic terminol-
ogy, different regions’ expenditures are “strategic complements.”
This is borne out in reality by the fact that in international
environmental forums countries often make “conditional com-
mitments” rather than unconditional ones. The simplicity of
our model makes the various effects and interactions directly
interpretable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Related
Literature, we briefly discuss some of the existing literature. In A
Canonical Model, we put forward a simple and general approach
where the formulas for the compensating and equivalent varia-
tions from interventions are derived. We then extend the model
to a multiregion setting where there are externalities across
regions. Numerical Solution develops the model’s implications
which we implement and assess and results are in Results. Some
suggestions are proposed in Ideas for Future Work. Some brief
reflections on the value and limitations of the approach are in
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Related Literature
This paper is informed by the extensive body of existing research
on the relationship between climate policy and the economy in
dynamic settings. The interested reader will find an excellent
overview of the voluminous literature in Hassler, Krusell, and
Nycander (1).
A key feature of climate change is the nature of the “stock
externality” whose effects accumulate over time. This is a fea-
ture of the integrated assessment models of Manne and Richels
(2) and Nordhaus (3). The two-sided uncertainty which cre-
ates embedded options in both the decisions to act and to wait
also features and is a feature of our model and is studied in
Kolstad (4).
There are many models which study issues related to those in
this paper using dynamic general equilibrium models to assess
the impact of policy alternatives. For example, Golosov et al. (5)
study optimal fuel taxes and Gerlagh and Liski (6) study the role
of commitment assumptions. Traeger (7) shares the ambition of
this paper to develop a simple analytically tractable approach
to climate change uncertainty, aiming to close the gap between
complex numeric models used in policy advising and stylized
models built for analytic insight. He posits a process by which
temperature increases and uses a damage function based on
the well-known Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE)
model’s specification. That paper builds on an intuitive under-
standing of the framework using computer simulations. Newbold
et al. (8) provide a tool to help analysts and decision makers
quickly explore the implications of various modeling assump-
tions with a focus on the social cost of carbon. Using a traditional
growth model, they posit a damage function for GDP based on
temperature increases due to accumulation of GHGs and con-
duct a sensitivity analysis to reflect parameter uncertainty, using
a simulation model. Their framework does not have losses due to
catastrophic events as such and also does not have the possibility
of a savior technology.
Our paper follows in the footsteps of a range of papers
that have modeled climate damages as stochastic catastrophes
that depend on the stock of CO2 and seek to provide sim-
ple analytical approaches to illuminate policy options. Gerlagh
and Liski (6) model an event that causes damage as a Pois-
son process. However, unlike in our paper, once it occurs, the
damage is a constant fraction of output and a constant sub-
tracted from utility; we allow for multiple events that may or
may not occur in successive years, such as hurricanes, droughts,
floods, wildfires, etc. Lemoine and Traeger (9, 10) explore cli-
mate tipping points. They model these as a form of model
discontinuity where the dynamics of the system shift abruptly,
and global warming reduces the Earth’s ability to remove CO2
from the atmosphere. The work of van den Bijgaart et al.
(11) also explores the implications of a dynamic equilibrium
model and simulates alternative scenarios to estimate the social
cost of carbon. They do not have the possibility of a techno-
logical breakthrough to mitigate climate change effects. Van
der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (12) model two effects of GHG
accumulation: technical “regress” where the production func-
tion has a multiplicative factor which follows Golosov et al.
(5). (A questionable feature of this specification is that the
effect is biggest as it starts and flattens thereafter.) They also
have a single “tipping” catastrophe at an unknown date whose
hazard rate increases with GHG accumulation and which will
cause a gradually increasing proportional drop in output. Tsur
and Zemel (13) study a different source of uncertainty due
to lack of knowledge. There is a critical level of the GHG
stock which, if hit, will with certainty trigger catastrophic loss.
The observation that the catastrophe has not yet occurred
allows policy makers to update (truncate) their prior about this
critical level.
We follow the literature in including the possibility of substan-
tial technological progress reflecting advances in clean energy
technology. This is endogenized in Acemoglu et al. (14) who
model gradual endogenous technical change as is standard in
economic growth models. We posit the possibility that techno-
logical progress could be a discontinuous “breakthrough” of the
kind that is posited by climate optimists.
In common with Hassler and Krusell (15) our model has
many regions. They develop a stochastic general equilibrium
model with multiple regions and discuss the spillovers of policies
such as carbon taxes. In their model, total factor productiv-
ity is a decreasing function of GHG stocks multiplied by a
stochastic shock. Therefore, GHG accumulation actually reduces
uncertainty in productivity equiproportionately with its level.
This differs from our focus on increasing catastrophic risks
that result from these accumulations. They also do not allow
for the possibility that technological progress may allow the
problem to be avoided or solved much more cheaply in the
future.
A Canonical Model
We begin with a single-region model and then extend it to
multiple regions or countries.
Core Single-Region Model. Let xt denote the logarithm of the
cumulated GHG level in the atmosphere in year t . This is our
state variable; its dynamics are explained below. The expected
GDP is denoted by yt . This can be a decreasing function yt(xt),
interpreted as the certainty equivalent of some normal (non-
catastrophic) uncertainty caused by GHG accumulation, for
example some loss of efficiency of production processes.
The loss caused by a catastrophic event (conditional on one
occurring in year t) is denoted by Kt , which can be an increasing
function Kt(xt). It is interpreted as a comprehensive certainty-
equivalent measure. For example, if the catastrophe lowers the
path of GDP from its status quo for several years, Kt includes
the discounted present value of the GDP gap. It is also intended
to include the monetary equivalent of human costs such as loss
of life and dislocation. Not surprisingly, this is a key parameter
in our analysis.
The catastrophe is modeled as a Poisson process with arrival
rate λ(xt), an increasing function. This is the simplest way
to model fat-tailed risk that rises with GHG accumulation. In
fact, with this formulation everything is in the tail. We inter-
pret this risk as the addition to any environmental risk that
may exist independently of climate change [Stott et al. (16) and
van Oldenborgh et al. (17)].
The logarithm of the stock of GHGs, x , ranges from −∞
to ∞, and λ(xt) is bounded between 0 and 1. For GHG accu-
mulations close to their current levels, which we normalize at
1 so the initial x is zero, we expect the catastrophic risk to
be extremely small and to rise only slowly. Eventually it will
rise more rapidly, but since the arrival probability is bounded
above by 1, the function must eventually become concave. The
obvious form for λ(xt) with these properties is a sigmoid;
indeed that is the function used for many specifications of state-
dependent increasing probabilities. [For example, Lin et al. (18)
project that the arrival of storms of the magnitude of Hurri-
cane Sandy are likely to increase by a factor as large as 17
in the period 2000–2100. This will severely threaten the flood
defenses of New York City.] Below, we specify it parametri-
cally for numerical calculations, but for the moment it is kept
general.
The dynamics of carbon accumulation have been found to fol-
low multiple paths [Inman (19)]. We adopt the formulation in
Hassler and Krusell (15). About 60% of the emissions dissipate
very quickly, so we omit them from consideration. About 20%,
i.e., half of the nontransient part, stay forever. The remaining
Besley and Dixit PNAS | March 19, 2019 | vol. 116 | no. 12 | 5271
stock dissipates with a depreciation rate of around 2.8%/year.
We use these numbers and base values for our model and calcu-
lations. Thus, if zt denotes the emission flow in period t , and the
fraction  is permanent, the permanent stock Pt is
Pt =
t∑
τ=0
 zτ .
Writing δ for the dissipation rate of the remaining fraction
(1− ), the dissipating stock, St , grows as
St = (1− ) zt + (1− δ) St−1
with S0 = 0. (Taking the stock at t = 0 to be zero is just a normal-
ization, as this level gets incorporated into the parameters of the
catastrophe hazard rate function λ(x ) defined below.) Then
xt = ln(Pt +St).
The emission flows zt can in general have any specification; we
expect this to be an increasing function of the GDP, i.e., yt . In
our numerical calculations we make specific assumptions; these
will be stated at that point.
A second and independent Poisson process represents a tech-
nological solution to the whole climate change problem. [For
example, Barrett (20) discusses the possibility of geoengineer-
ing solutions.] Its arrival rate is denoted by µ(xt). This can be
an increasing function of the GHG level—as the problem wors-
ens, more resources are devoted to research and development
(R&D)—or a decreasing function—as the problem worsens,
more resources are needed to solve it, but because GDP falls
as GHG accumulation lowers productivity, fewer resources are
available for R&D. If the technological solution arrives in year t ,
thereafter no catastrophes will occur. We assume that GDP will
then go on growing at rate g :
yt+τ = yt (1 + g)
τ .
So in the absence of a catastrophe, or after a miracle rescue
technology has appeared, the value of the economy at period t
will be
V ∗ (yt)=
∞∑
τ=0
yt
[
1 + g
1 + r
]τ
= yt
[
1 + r
r − g
]
independently of x , and r > g is the discount rate. [r > g is the
standard dynamic efficiency or convergence condition in growth
models; see Dixit (ref. 21, pp. 59 and 109). For its empirical
relevance, see Piketty (22).]
At t = 0, before the miracle rescue technology has appeared, the
expected net present value (NPV) of the economy—NPV of the
GDP minus the expected discounted costs of catastrophes—can
be shown to be (see SI Appendix, section 1 for the derivation)
V (x0) =
∞∑
t=0
Dt [ bt(xt) yt(xt) −λt(xt)Kt(xt) ], [1]
where
D(0) = 1, DT+1 =
T∏
t=0
1−µ(xt)
1 + r
and
bt(xt) =
r − g + (1 + g)µ(xt)
r − g .
Eq. 1 has an intuitive interpretation with λt (xt)Kt (xt) being
deducted from the maximum payoff in each period. [Note that
only the expected loss λt(xt)Kt(xt) from a catastrophe matters,
not the probability and the loss separately. So we have some
freedom in what follows in specifying the x dependence of the
two.]
We use the standard economic measures of willingness to pay
for a change, namely compensating and equivalent variations.
The former asks how much GDP a society would be willing to
sacrifice to make it equally well off before and after a reduction
in catastrophic risk. The latter asks the question in reverse: What
increase in GDP would be needed without the reduction in catas-
trophic risk to make the value the same. The first measure is the
willingness to pay for the change, and the second is the GDP
increase that would be an acceptable alternative to the change.
To capture these ideas formally and compute them numer-
ically, we suppose some parameters change with new values
having a “˜” above them; i.e., Dt is replaced byD˜t , the function
bt(xt) by b˜t(xt), etc., and the valueV (x0) by V˜ (x0). For the com-
pensating variation we ask what fractional decrease θCV in GDP
at all times at the new parameters would yield the same value as
before. That is, we want to find θCV such that
V (x0) =
∞∑
t=0
D˜t
[
b˜t(xt) { (1− θCV ) yt(xt)} − λ˜t(xt)Kt(xt)
]
,
where the tildes show that the right-hand side is evaluated at the
new parameters. And for the equivalent variation we ask what
fractional increase in GDP at the old parameters would yield the
new value; i.e., we want to find θEV such that
V˜ (x0) =
∞∑
t=0
Dt [ bt(xt) { (1 + θEV ) yt(xt)} −λt(xt)Kt(xt) ],
where the absence of tildes on the right-hand side means that it
is evaluated at the old parameters. Simple algebra, detailed in SI
Appendix, section 3, shows that
θCV =
V˜ (x0)−V (x0)∑∞
t=0 D˜t b˜t(xt) yt(xt)
[2]
and
θEV =
V˜ (x0)−V (x0)∑∞
t=0Dt bt(xt) yt(xt)
. [3]
Although the formulas for the two variations look very simi-
lar, they are not: The denominators on the right-hand sides are
evaluated for different parameters, the new ones in Eq. 2 and
the old ones in Eq. 3, as shown by the presence or absence of
tildes. However, in the numerical example that we solve, these
variations turn out to be equal.
Multiple Regions. Now consider a world with many regions
indexed by superscript i , where the externality from emissions
and proneness to catastrophe is global. We can think of regions
as either countries or groups of countries.
Writing z it for the emission flows in region i , the permanent
and dissipating components Pt and St of the global stock now
follow
Pt =
t∑
τ=0
∑
i
 z iτ
and
St = (1− )
∑
i
z it + (1− δ) St−1
with S0 = 0, and then the state variable, namely log aggregate
log-GHG accumulation Xt , is
Xt = ln(Pt +St).
5272 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1802864115 Besley and Dixit
CO
LL
O
Q
U
IU
M
PA
PE
R
EN
V
IR
O
N
M
EN
TA
L
SC
IE
N
CE
S
Thus, emissions are a global public bad. To reflect this, region i ’s
GDP is denoted by y i(X ) and the cost of a catastrophe in region
i is K i(X ). The growth rate of these, g i , can also be region
specific. The arrival rate of the catastrophe process is λi(X )
for region i ; it can differ across the regions because although
they are all affected by the worldwide X , their probabilities and
costs can depend on whether they are in a hurricane-prone area
or a flood zone, etc. The technological solution, if it material-
izes, is highly likely to be global. This implies that the arrival
rate function for that process should be the same for all regions
i and hence denoted by µ(X ). However, our framework can
cope straightforwardly with the possibility of more local solu-
tions, such as levees or better rain capture to cope with droughts,
in which case there would be separate functions µi(X ).
For the core analysis, it makes sense to have the discount rate
r being common to all regions if capital markets are function-
ing well. But it could also differ in a more general setting to
capture the possibility of region-specific capital market imper-
fections which mean that the returns to capital are not equalized
across regions.
Putting this together, we can compute the value in any region
i using the recursion relation specified above, yielding a solution
very similar to Eq. 1 for the one-region or whole-world case,
V i(X0) =
∞∑
t=0
D it
[
bit (Xt) y
i
t (Xt) −λit(Xt)K it (Xt)
]
, [4]
where
D i(0) = 1, D iT+1 =
T∏
t=0
1−µi(Xt)
1 + r i
and
bit (Xt) =
r i − g i + (1 + g i)µi(Xt)
r i − g i .
The crucial difference is that Xt rather than the region-specific
x it enters, reflecting the global interdependence. Hence the will-
ingness to pay for reductions in emissions will be interdependent
and depend on the time path of emissions in other countries.
Numerical Solution
We study the model’s implications using a numerical solution. To
implement this, we make a few specific assumptions and solve
the model with these in place. These assumptions imply that
the equivalent and compensating variations are the same. After
giving the solution, we choose specific parameter values to pro-
vide a quantitative assessment of the willingness to pay to avoid
the risks associated with climate change. These are informed
by a range of considerations including the losses that were
experienced following Hurricane Katrina in the United States.
Interested readers can download the spreadsheet (Dataset S1)
and perform their own calculations with different parameter
values.
Parameterization. To simplify notation, we temporarily revert to
the case of a single region and hence drop the i superscript. We
assume that, under status quo policies, the GDP (although the
model is couched in terms of GDP, in principle these could be
utility payoffs rather than income) and the cost of a catastrophe
keep on growing at a fixed rate g so that
yt = y0 (1 + g)
t , Kt =K0 (1 + g)
t .
We also assume that arrival rate for the savior technology is
constant at µ, which captures a rough balance of the two forces
mentioned above. Then Eq. 1 simplifies to (the derivation is in
SI Appendix, section 2)
V (x0) = y0
1 + r
r − g −K0 Λ, [5]
where
Λ =
∞∑
t=0
[
(1 + g)(1−µ)
1 + r
]t
λ(xt).
This can be thought of as an expected present value operator
that captures the influence of the key parameters embedded in
λ(xt) acting through the growth parameters in xt and µ. More-
over the solution in Eq. 5 has a nice interpretation: It is the full
discounted present value of GDP absent any catastrophes, minus
the expected discounted cost of catastrophes as captured in Λ
and scaled by the initial condition K0. In our base-case numeri-
cal calculations we assume that emission flows zt grow at a rate
α which is equal to the GDP rate of growth g . We examine the
effects of various policies which lower α. For example, policies
which effect a Kyoto-style reduction would lower α by 30%.
We specify the arrival rate of the catastrophe Poisson process
as the usual logistic function
λ(x ) = eγ x/[ J + eγ x ]
with two parameters J and γ. (The logistic is a natural functional
form in this context. The state variable, the natural log of accu-
mulated GHGs, goes from −∞ to∞; the probability goes from
0 to 1. We should expect the function to be initially convex while
it flattens out eventually.)
A convenient feature of this special case is that the compensat-
ing and equivalent variations are the same, making it unnecessary
to differentiate between them in what follows. We derive the for-
mula for them in SI Appendix, section 3 and show that this is
equal to
θ=
r − g
1 + r
K0
y0
(Λ− Λ˜) [6]
when there is a parameter shift which moves from Λ to Λ˜. A con-
venient feature of Eq. 6 is that the “loss ratio,” K0/y0, simply
multiplies the expression for the compensating variation, scaling
it up or down.
The generalization of this formula to allow for regional dif-
ferences is straightforward. To do so, we suppose that  and δ
pertain to global carbon dynamics so that they are the same for
all regions. This also implies that the state variable X is global.
The GDP levels y i0; the costs of catastrophes K i0 ; the functional
form of the catastrophe hazard functions λi(X ); and the param-
eters g i , r i , and µi are all allowed to be region specific. Then Eq.
6 in a multiregion world becomes
θi =
r i − g i
1 + r i
(
K i0
y i0
)i
(Λi − Λ˜i), [7]
where
Λi =
∞∑
t=0
[
(1 + g i)(1−µi)
1 + r i
]t
λi(Xt).
This has the neat feature that all of the interdependence is
captured entirely through λi (Xt). In this formula, all strategic
interaction between regions is mediated by the common state
variable Xt . So whether there are strategic complements or
strategic substitutes depends on how the interventions of other
countries change Xt .
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Choice of Parameter Values. We specify baseline values for the
parameters and consider a range around them in numerical
solutions. Since we err toward assuming somewhat optimistic
parameter values, any conclusions below are quite conserva-
tive. Advocating significant expenditures based on the chosen
parameter values would hold a fortiori for the specifications and
parameter values favored by those with more alarmist views of
climate change problems.
Hence our baseline sets
r = 0.05, g = 0.03, α= 0.03, δ= 0.03,
= 0.5, µ= 0.01, y0 = 1, K0 = 2. [8]
The discount rate r is much higher than the rate advocated by
those who favor strong policies to counter climate change, for
example Stern (23), and close to the 5% or more that was advo-
cated by critics of the Stern review, for example Weitzman (24).
This is a specific example of our desire to make conservative
assumptions since the lower the discount rate, the more future
damage weighs in the calculation and the greater will be the jus-
tification for taking countermeasures. The 3% status quo growth
rate is again quite optimistic. We have set α= g , so under the sta-
tus quo GHG emissions would keep step with economic growth.
The values of the permanent component of emissions  and the
dissipation rate δ of the rest are in broad agreement with Has-
sler and Krusell (15) and Inman (19). Very little is known about
the likelihood of a total technological solution, but the choice
µ= 0.01 implies that the probability of such a solution having
arrived rises to 50% in 70 years, which also seems optimistic. Set-
ting y0 = 1 is just a normalization and we discuss the justification
of K0 below.
In the logistic specification of the function λ(x ) our base values
are γ= 1.5 and J = 20,000. With these parameter choices, the
probability of at least one catastrophe occurring by time T rises
to 50% in T = 56 years and to 90% in 81 years. These again are
fairly optimistic numbers. It should be clear to the reader that all
of these magnitudes could be varied and an Excel spreadsheet
(Dataset S1) allows the interested reader to do so.
In our Excel file (Dataset S1), we carry out the sum defin-
ing Λ in Eq. 5 to 1,000 years, when the terms generally become
of the order of 10−12. Again readers can easily alter the file as
they wish.
Specifying the Expected Cost of a Catastrophe. As emphasized in
reviews of integrated assessment models such as Metcalf (25),
there is a considerable uncertainty about the right assumptions
to make about the likely damages from higher carbon emis-
sions. We anchor our estimates around the US experience of
Hurricane Katrina, which hit New Orleans and other parts of
the southeastern United States in late August 2005 and had
many of the features that are expected to figure in future envi-
ronmental catastrophes—flooding, wind and water damage to
structures, loss of life, dislocation of populations and disruption
of economic activity, and so on. That storm cannot be attributed
directly to climate change, but a rough quantification of its
effects gives us a useful starting point for considering costs of
catastrophes. Although this is a specific case, it would be straight-
forward to assess the sensitivity of the results to alternative
scenarios.
We begin with the loss of GDP. Before Katrina, New
Orleans’ GDP was growing fast, from $52.38 billion in 2001 to
$72.91 billion in 2005, which is an annual growth rate of 8.6%.
(These numbers come from an article on the Atlanta Federal
Reserve website, “New Orleans, 10 Years after Katrina,” https://
www.frbatlanta.org/economy-matters/2015/08/20/new-orleans-10-
years-after-katrina, accessed May 10, 2017.) To assess the
shortfall of GDP below what it would have been without
Katrina, let us take a highly conservative approach by assuming
that the GDP would have grown for the next three years at
the slower rate experienced by the United States as a whole.
Table 1 shows the calculations. The cumulative shortfall for the
three years from 2006 to 2008 is then $24.8 billion, which is
34% of the 2005 GDP level. Effects of Katrina continued for
much longer than three years, but after 2009 the calculation gets
trickier because of the need to separate the effects of Katrina
from those of the Great Recession that began in 2008. We
again take a conservative approach by omitting any GDP losses
beyond three years.
Hurricane Katrina caused considerable loss of, and dam-
age to, capital. For the whole region affected by Katrina,
which comprises the states of Louisiana, Florida, and Missis-
sippi, private insured and uninsured losses are estimated at
$108 billion, of which about half occurred in New Orleans
alone. In addition, restoration of the damaged levees and
coastal restoration and urban water management projects in New
Orleans required about $29 billion. These costs—$54 billion +
$29 billion = $83 billion—amount to over 113% of the city’s
2005 GDP (from https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-katrina-
facts-damage-and-economic-effects-3306023, accessed May 10,
2017).
Thus, the capital costs (113%) and GDP losses (34%) taken
together come to 147% of one year’s GDP in New Orleans.
It should also be noted that these calculations do not include
human costs—1,836 lives lost, over 100,000 people displaced
and their lives disrupted, trauma suffered by nearly the whole
population (over 400,000) of that city, and much more. Our
conclusion from this exercise is that a reasonable baseline (con-
servative) case is K0 = 2 y0. But to recognize the wide possible
range of estimates, we consider variations in K0/y0 between 1
and 3.
Two other aspects of our specification go in opposite direc-
tions. First, we are extrapolating from Katrina, which was a
local event, to the whole United States (or other comparable
regions). At the present time it seems implausible that such
an event could hit the whole country in any one year. How-
ever, multiple events of this kind are already hitting different
areas of the country—major hurricanes, nor’easters, California’s
sequence of drought–wildfires–rainstorms–mudslides, and so on.
Therefore, in the time frame where the probability of catastro-
phe in our model rises substantially—50–60 years—such losses
on a national scale do not seem so implausible. However, readers
can easily alter our results to suit their preferred estimates, since
our formula for θ is proportional to K0/y0. Second, we assume
that after the loss from a catastrophic event, growth is restored
to the old level g . However, catastrophes such as a shift in the
pattern of a seasonal monsoon can lower the growth rate per-
manently, magnifying the formula for θ. Once again interested
readers can easily modify the Excel file (Dataset S1) to include
such effects.
Results
Single Country. We begin with the single-country case. This will
help to get a feel for the quantitative magnitudes which come
out of the model. In the first instance, we use the base parameters
above. But we will also see how our conclusions vary with some
of these.
Table 1. GDP loss due to Katrina in New Orleans
Actual GDP, US growth rate, Hypothetical GDP, Shortfall,
Year $ billion % per year $ billion $ billion
2005 72.91
2006 71.18 5.8 77.14 5.96
2007 70.93 4.5 80.61 9.68
2008 72.82 1.7 81.98 9.16
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First, consider the Kyoto reduction in GHG emissions, low-
ering α by 30%, i.e., from 0.03 to 0.021. This has a variation
(compensating or equivalent) of 0.033. That is, we should be will-
ing to pay a cost of 3.3% of GDP each year to bring about the
Kyoto reduction. This is a large number; for the United States it
amounts to about $500 billion/year (and growing at 3% in step
with GDP growth). However, to put it in perspective, it is equiv-
alent only to permanently sacrificing one good year of economic
growth.
This number is quite sensitive to the outlook for growth and if
the growth projection were 1% instead of 3%, which is more in
line with recent growth pessimism, then this number also falls by
around one-third to 1.1% of current GDP. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, the willingness to pay for the Kyoto reduction is increased
significantly by having a smaller discount rate with an increase
in the willingness to pay to 4.8% if the discount rate is r = 0.04.
One could also argue that the Hurricane Katrina output loss is
too conservative to capture the kind of catastrophic change that
could be envisaged. Suppose that K0/y0 is equal to 3 instead of
2; then the willingness to pay would increase to 5% of GDP. The
bottom line in all cases is that the plausible willingness to pay
for Kyoto-style reductions is in the range of 1− 5%. While one
would seek to design policies which do this both fairly and effi-
ciently, the sizes of the sacrifices in consumption that are needed
are small in comparison with historic increases in material living
standards.
Next consider increasing µ from 0.01 to 0.015. This would
raise the probability that a solution has been found in 25 years’
time from 22% to 31%. This might be feasible with the kind of
investment in science that has been seen in the past in pursuit of
military ends or space travel. But how much does our model sug-
gest would be a reasonable commitment of aggregate resources
to achieve this end? The willingness to pay for this in our base-
line case is 0.033; i.e., we should be willing to invest 3.3% of
GDP, or $500 billion/y for the United States (and growing at
3%), to raise the probability of a complete technological solution
by 50%. To put this in perspective, note that this is less than the
roughly 4% of GDP that the US Government spends on national
defense although considerably in excess of the (around) $20 bi-
llion/y spent on NASA and the total NSF budget of around $6
billion.
Multiple Countries. We consider four regions which we call China,
the United States, Europe, and the rest of the world (RoW).
[Hassler and Krusell (15) specify Africa as the fourth region in
their approach.] Their GDP shares and share of CO2 emissions
are as follows:
Region GDP share, % CO2 share, %
China 15 30
United States 15 15
Europe 20 15
RoW 50 40
The world GDP and initial emission level are both normalized
to 1. And in the baseline we assume that the parameter values in
Eq. 8 are maintained.
What makes the multicountry case interesting is how the
willingness to pay in one country is affected by actions taken
elsewhere. Due to the global nature of the externality, the will-
ingness of the United States or China to take a Kyoto-style cut
would depend on the path of emissions taken elsewhere. Associ-
ated with any proposal, therefore, would be an associated vector{
θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4
}
denoting the willingness to pay in each region.
One of the critical issues in negotiations over emissions reduction
is how the benefits and costs are shared, which creates potential
for free riding, particularly when there are difficulties of enforce-
ment. Aldy et al. (26) discuss the complex issues that are involved
in aligning this. Our ready-reckoner approach will be useful in
giving an insight into how the heterogeneity in willingness to
pay depends upon underlying differences in economic prospects
for the regions of the world. If the willingness to pay is similar,
then it should be easier to achieve consensus. However, there
are still issues of how to enforce agreements, which we do not
discuss here.
To provide a benchmark, we consider an optimistic case in
which all countries follow the Kyoto benchmark with a cut in
emissions such that αi falls from 0.03 to 0.021. In this case, the
willingness to pay is equal to about 3.3% in all regions of the
world just as in the single-country model. Now consider what
happens if one region decides to opt out of the deal and free
ride. Then how big would the loss from that be to the partic-
ipating countries? Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that it
is the United States that opts out. Now the willingness of the
other three regions to pay for Kyoto falls to around 2.7%. But
the United States still gets a benefit of this amount from what
other countries are doing without paying any cost. Thus, around
80% of the benefit from emissions reductions is available to a
free rider conditional on full compliance elsewhere. Thus, more
relevant for calculating whether a country is willing to participate
is not the total gain but rather the marginal willingness to pay,
assuming that other countries go along with a Kyoto-style cut,
and this is only around 0.6% of GDP, much lower than the 3.3%
of the one-country model. That said, it still amounts to around
$90 billion in the case of the United States or a little under $300
per US citizen.
Another interesting question to ask is, What should be China’s
or the United States’ willingness to pay for unilateral action,
assuming that no other country participates? For this we sup-
pose that the rest of the world maintainsαi = 0.03 and that either
China or the United States cuts αi to 0.21. This yields a willing-
ness to pay for the country that is cutting only 0.4% of GDP since
many of the gains accrue to other countries. Note that this is less
than the willingness to pay conditional on full participation by
others and vividly illustrates how strategic interdependence can
change willingness to pay to reduce emissions. The fact that uni-
lateral action is more valuable when more countries participate
illustrates how emissions reductions are strategic complements
with greater action in one part of the world when more countries
also participate in emissions reduction. So the cost of the United
States leaving an agreement is also detrimental to the willingness
of other countries to participate quite apart from any moral sense
of shared burden.
The complementarity result does not, however, appear to be a
general feature of the model. It arises because with the param-
eterization that we use, the world is operating in a region of
the λ (X ) function whose curvature is such that, when a coun-
try makes a contribution to reducing X , then this has a bigger
effect on λ (X ) when other countries also contribute, thereby
increasing that country’s willingness to pay.
Given the baseline parameter values, the proportionate gains
and losses are similar in all regions. We now illustrate two inter-
esting sources of heterogeneity. The first one is where countries
face different growth prospects. And the second one is where the
costs of catastrophes differ by region.
Recent discussions around the potential for secular stagnation
[for example, Summers (27)] suggest that advanced economies
such as those of the United States and Europe face a weaker
growth outlook. One influential version of this view due to
Gordon (28) centers on a slowdown in the innovation pro-
cess, afflicting mainly advanced economies. This is possible even
if there is maintenance of strong growth in China and the
RoW as the process of catchup and convergence continues. We
now show that views about this have a material effect on the
willingness-to-pay calculations in our model.
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To capture this, we assume that growth will be only around
1% in the future for the United States and Europe while remain-
ing at 3% for China and the RoW. In our first calculation, we
suppose that emissions’ growth in the United States and Europe
is not affected by slow growth so α= 0.03 without emissions
reduction and 0.021 in a Kyoto-style cut. Now the benefit from
collective action for the United States and Europe falls to around
1% of GDP. More strikingly still, the value of unilateral action
is only 0.01% of GDP or just $18 billion in the case of the
United States. So unilateral action under a pessimistic scenario
for growth is highly unrewarding when there is growth pessimism
for the United States.
The second source of heterogeneity that we consider con-
cerns what happens if the losses from catastrophes are unevenly
distributed. Suppose that the United States and Europe have
reasons to be sanguine about the cost of catastrophes and their
willingness to pay is based on K0/y0 = 1 while in China and the
RoW, the losses are larger withK0/y0 = 3. Then how do we think
that this will affect the geopolitics of reaching an agreement?
First, consider a multilateral agreement to α= 0.021. The will-
ingness to pay in China and the RoW now increases by a factor
of 1.5 to around 5% of GDP while that in the United States and
Europe would fall to around 1.7%. The willingness to pay with
unilateral action will similarly fall.
Together these results illustrate how regional interdependence
matters, more so when the outlook is heterogeneous across
regions. Moreover, it is clear that the magnitude of the willing-
ness to pay is influenced significantly by views about the outlook
for growth and the potential sizes of the catastrophes that might
be faced. Of course, all of these numbers are only illustrative but
they show that the perceptions around the distribution of dam-
ages due to climate change affect the potential for self-interest
to motivate action and our framework allows us to think about
the magnitudes involved and sensitivity to parameter values in a
highly transparent way. The very simple model structure that we
use also means that it is easy to gain an intuitive understanding
of what is going on.
Ideas for Future Work
The framework that we have proposed suggests various direc-
tions for future work. One interesting issue is to explore incen-
tives for joining coalitions and to explore a formal analysis of
stable coalitions along the lines of Nordhaus (29). The model as
it stands is sufficiently linear that the value function for a coali-
tion is simply the sum of those for any partitions, but introducing
gains from trade, or Nordhaus-style enforcement mechanisms by
climate clubs, could create superadditivity and allow one to look
for the core of the game for a given X .
Future work could also consider alternative ways in which
growth is affected by climate change. In the framework presented
here, catastrophes have transitory effects and eventually growth
is restored. However, there is the possibility that growth could
be reduced permanently and this would be an interesting issue to
explore in the future.
Concluding Comments
This paper has put forward a model to evaluate the risks of cli-
mate catastrophes in a multiregion world. We have developed
a simple formulation of the costs of catastrophic risk and the
willingness to pay for mitigation. The model is simple and trans-
parent and can be solved on a spread sheet, thereby giving a
simple way of considering the kinds of sacrifice that a society
might make to mitigate these risks. In our baseline, the numbers
turn out to be quite large (typically in excess of 1% of GDP). Of
course, ensuring that reductions in consumption brought about
by taxation are actually spent wisely and effectively to bring about
emissions reduction and/or investments in technology is by no
means easy. And there are complicated issues in policy design
that we have not tackled here.
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